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Reaching a Sense of Justice:
Understanding How the Facilitation
Theory of Prosecution Under Federal
Criminal Law Can Be Used to Hold
Hard Targets Accountable for Financial
Crimes and Corporate Corruption
Thomas M. DiBiagio*
Abstract
A fundamental principle of criminal law is that to hold a
defendant accountable, the prosecution must prove that he
culpably participated in the criminal activity. To prove culpable
participation, the government can prove a defendant’s direct
knowledge of and active participation in the criminal conduct.
However, because of the nature of financial crimes and corporate
misconduct, culpable targets often are able to insulate themselves
from the underlying criminal conduct and thereby, frustrate the
prosecution’s ability to meet this evidentiary standard. The
resulting impunity undermines the public’s trust and confidence
in the fundamental fairness of the enforcement of the criminal
laws.
This Article asserts that the facilitation theory of prosecution
can be used to extend the limits of the mail and wire fraud statute
to capture culpable targets for financial crimes and corporate
corruption. Under the facilitation theory, a defendant culpably
participates in criminal conduct when he knowingly acts to
influence, enable, further, or conceal the criminal conduct.
Although there are no legal barriers to bringing financial
crimes and corporate corruption in full view, it is acknowledged
that there are substantial factual challenges. These cases often
* Partner, Baker Botts LLP and former United States Attorney, District
of Maryland.

256

REACHING A SENSE OF JUSTICE

257

involve complex fact patterns and shifting narratives.
Nevertheless, the interest of justice compel a persistent effort by
prosecutors to establish real consequences for facilitating
corporate criminal conduct.
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I. Introduction
A fundamental principle of criminal law is that to hold a
defendant accountable, the prosecution must prove that he
culpably participated in the criminal activity.1 To prove culpable
participation, the government must show that the defendant
directly participated in the criminal act or that he facilitated the
criminal conduct.2 A defendant facilitates criminal conduct when
he knowingly acts to influence, enable, further, or conceal the
criminal activity. Although not explicitly identified in the existing
1. See Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250–51 (1952) (“A
relation between some mental element and punishment for a harmful act is
almost as instinctive as the child's familiar exculpatory ‘But I didn't mean to
. . . .’”).
2. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 843(b) (2012) (“It shall be unlawful for any person
to knowingly or intentionally use any communication facility in committing or in
causing or facilitating the commission of any act or acts constituting a felony
. . . .” (emphasis added)).
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analysis of the principles of prosecution under federal criminal
law, the facilitation theory is directly incorporated into several
federal criminal statutes3 and is expressed most often through
the application of the federal conspiracy and aiding and abetting
statutes.4
The reach of the facilitation theory has not, however, been
fully developed. In particular, a meaningful effort has not been
made to use the facilitation theory to hold white-collar targets—
executive management, third-party professionals, and others—
accountable for financial crimes and corporate misconduct.5
Prosecutors generally seek strong and substantial evidence that
hard targets actively participated in or had direct knowledge of
the financial crimes and corporate misconduct.6 Because hard
targets act to insulate themselves from active participation in
and direct knowledge of the underlying criminal conduct, this
evidentiary standard is rarely satisfied.7 Consequently, criminal
accountability for financial crimes and corporate misconduct
often results in the criminal prosecution of lower level employees
or the imposition of fines on shareholders.8 Causing shareholders
3. See infra notes 18–20 and accompanying text (citing multiple statutes
that follow the facilitation theory).
4. See 18 U.S.C. § 2 (2012) (punishing those who aid, abet, or willfully
cause a criminal act as if they were the principal actor); 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2012)
(criminalizing any conspiracy to violate the laws of the United States).
5. See Amy J. Sepinwall, Responsible Shares and Shared Responsibility:
In Defense of Responsible Corporate Officer Liability, 2014 COLUM. BUS. L. REV.
371, 374–75 (2014) (“[R]ecent and dramatic instances of corporate
crime . . . have led to glaringly few prosecutions of the individuals who help the
offending corporations.”).
6. See id. at 377 (“[C]riminal law typically requires that a defendant
culpably causes the conduct with which she is charged, yet corporate
officers . . . may not have participated in the crimes of their corporation.”).
7. See id. (concluding that attempts to prosecute corporate officers only
when they actively participate will lead to few prosecutions, if any at all).
8. See David Enrich, A Hedge Fund Manager Committed Fraud. Would
the U.S. Let Him Go?, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 18, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/
2017/11/18/business/a-hedge-fund-manager-committed- fraud- would-the-us-lethim-go.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2018)
After the financial crisis last decade, the federal government was
expected to aggressively pursue criminal cases against top financiers:
the fund managers, bankers, mortgage lenders and Wall Street
executives who helped cause the global economy to crater. But
prosecutions have been rare. The exceptions have been obscure or
relatively junior industry players against whom it was easy to build
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to pay financial penalties or putting lower level employees in jail,
however, provides little sense of justice. Moreover, the failure to
hold hard targets accountable furthers the public’s perception of
impunity for individuals who have amassed power and influence
and, ultimately, undermines the public’s trust and confidence in
the fundamental fairness of the enforcement of criminal laws.9
This Article asserts that the prosecution of senior executives,
third-party professionals, and others for financial crimes and
corporate corruption is within the existing limits of the
facilitation theory under federal criminal law.10 By combining the
facilitation theory of prosecution with existing theories of
accomplice and co-conspirator liability, prosecutors can hold hard
cases but who did not bear primary responsibility for the crisis.
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Hiroko Tabuchi & Jack
Ewing, Volkswagen to Pay $14.7 Billion to Settle Diesel Claims in U.S., N.Y.
TIMES
(June
27,
2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/
06/28/business/volkswagen-settlement-diesel-scandal.html (last visited Jan. 31,
2018) (discussing Volkswagen’s agreement to pay a fine for installing illegal
engine software designed to deceive regulators) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review); Vikas Bajaj, The Lesson of the General Motors Settlement,
N.Y.
TIMES:
TAKING
NOTE
(Sept.
17,
2015,
4:04
PM),
https://takingnote.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/09/17/the-lesson-of-the-generalmotors-settlement/ (last visited Jan. 31, 2018) (acknowledging that General
Motors agreed to pay $900 million fine for failing to disclose defective ignition
switch) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
9. Numerous influential legal scholars have recognized the importance of
the public seeing that justice. See, e.g., R v. Sussex Justices (Ex parte McCarthy)
[1924] 1 KB 256, 259 (Lord Hewart CJ) (“[It] is of fundamental importance that
justice should not only be done, but should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen
to be done.”); Roscoe Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the
Administration of Justice, 29 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 395 (1906) (“The Anglo-Saxon
laws continually direct that justice is to be done equally to rich and to poor, and
the king exhorts that the peace be kept better than has been wont, and that
‘men of every order readily submit . . . each to that law which is appropriate to
him.’”); see also Tracey L. Meares, Everything Old Is New Again: Fundamental
Fairness and the Legitimacy of Criminal Justice, 3 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 105, 108
(2005)
The public is much more likely to support and participate in the
criminal justice process and support those officials who run it when
the public believes that the process is run fairly. If the American
public does not perceive its criminal justice system to be fair, negative
consequences can result. Diminished public support for the criminal
justice system, taken to the extreme, can lead to diminished respect
for the law and, thereby, less compliance with the law.
10. See infra Part II (discussing the facilitation theory and how it currently
exists within different laws).
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targets accountable for financial crimes and corporate
misconduct.11 This approach allows prosecutors to obtain
convictions against hard targets by proving that they facilitated
the criminal conduct rather than actively participated in or
directly knew of the underlying criminal conduct.12 The result
would be a practical and meaningful theory of criminal
prosecution that would establish real consequences for powerful
and influential defendants who facilitate financial crimes and
corporate corruption.13
II. The Facilitation Theory of Prosecution
The need to hold all culpable individuals accountable for
criminal wrongdoing is fundamental to maintaining public trust
and confidence in the criminal process.14 Moreover, the ends of
criminal justice would be defeated if these prosecutorial
judgments are compromised. The principle underlying the
facilitation theory of prosecution is that allowing individuals who
facilitate criminal conduct to act with impunity would be an
injustice. Thus, the facilitation theory requires that a defendant
culpably participate in the criminal activity.15 To prove culpable
participation, the government must prove that a defendant
actively participated in or facilitated the criminal act.16 To prove
that a defendant knowingly facilitated the criminal conduct, the
prosecution must show that a defendant acted knowingly to
11. See infra Part II (addressing the ways in which the theory can be
combined with existing laws).
12. See infra Part II (describing how the facilitation theory will allow for a
broader range of prosecutions).
13. See infra Part III (concluding that this theory will provide meaningful
consequences for corporate violations of the law).
14. See supra note 9 and accompanying text (discussing the disadvantages
of a lack of public confidence).
15. See United States v. Raza, 876 F.3d 604, 625 (4th Cir. 2017) (affirming
conspiracy conviction based on evidence that defendants prepared false
mortgage loan applications for bank borrowers); United States v. Harris, 576 F.
App’x 265, 275 (4th Cir. 2014) (affirming wire fraud conviction based on
evidence that defendant intentionally deprived investors of funds through
misrepresentations and deceit).
16. See supra note 2 and accompanying text (addressing the requirements
for culpable conduct).
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influence, enable, further or conceal the criminal conduct to a
degree sufficient to warrant criminal prosecution.17
The facilitation theory is explicitly incorporated into several
federal criminal law statutes. For example, the theory is included
in the federal money laundering statute, which makes it a
criminal offense to launder criminal proceeds with the intent to
facilitate or conceal the underlying criminal activity.18 The
federal drug trafficking statute, which makes it a crime to use a
communication device to facilitate a drug offense, also
incorporates the facilitation theory.19 The principle is also
included in the federal obstruction statutes that criminalize acts
to intimidate witnesses and alter or destroy documents with the
intent to conceal criminal activity or obstruct criminal
17. See supra note 2 and accompanying text (defining facilitation of a
crime).
18. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956(a)(1)(A)(i), (a)(1)(B)(i) (2012) (criminalizing
money laundering based on the intent to promote the unlawful activity or
conceal the proceeds of unlawful activity); see also United States v. Jones, 664
F.3d 966, 977–78 (5th Cir. 2011) (affirming defendants’ convictions for money
laundering when evidence showed that defendants had knowledge that they
were improperly billing Medicare claims and that they were moving millions of
dollars between account to conceal or disguise the source of the proceeds);
United States v. Huezo, 546 F.3d 174, 181 (2d Cir. 2008) (determining that the
evidence that brokers were used to deposit cash in small increments, money was
packaged in bundled stacks, and defendant was seen in possession of the
bundled stacks of money established defendant had the requisite criminal
knowledge and intent to support his conviction for money laundering); United
States v. Hudspeth, 525 F.3d 667, 678–79 (8th Cir. 2008) (concluding that there
was sufficient evidence to establish that the defendant knowingly laundered
money when he knew his customers were diverting the drugs, he deposited
payments from customers into an account also used to pay his businesses’ bills,
and he signed every check).
19. See 21 U.S.C. § 843(b) (2012) (“It shall be unlawful for any person to
knowingly or intentionally use any communication facility in committing or in
causing or facilitating the commission of any act or acts constituting a felony
under any provision of this subchapter or subchapter II of this chapter.”); see
also United States v. Almeida-Olivas, 865 F.3d 1060, 1063 (8th Cir. 2017)
(affirming defendant’s § 843(b) conviction when the government presented
multiple intercepted phone calls between the defendant and the initial target of
the investigation discussing methamphetamine); United States v. Whitten, 706
F.2d 1000, 1006–07 (9th Cir. 1983) (affirming defendant’s § 843(b) conviction
when the government had presented testimony by coconspirators that the
defendant often used money orders in drug sales); United States v. Lerma, 657
F.2d 786, 789 (5th Cir. 1981) (determining evidence of several calls between a
narcotics buyer and the seller-defendant was sufficient to establish a violation
of § 843(b)).
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investigations or proceedings.20 It is also included in the theory
underlying the crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client
privilege, which strips the protections of the attorney-client
privilege when the attorney’s services have been used to further
criminal conduct.21 Finally, the facilitation theory is expressed
20. See 18 U.S.C. § 1510 (2012) (criminalizing the obstruction of a criminal
investigation); United States v. Sterling, 860 F.3d 233, 246 (4th Cir. 2017)
(affirming defendant’s obstruction of justice conviction for deletion of an email
relevant to criminal investigation); United States v. Lippman, 492 F.2d 314, 317
(6th Cir. 1974) (requiring the defendant have “actual knowledge that the
intended recipient of the information be a criminal investigator” to be convicted
of obstruction); United States v. Abrams, 543 F. Supp. 1184, 1187 (S.D.N.Y.
1982)
Significantly, the government need not prove that a federal criminal
investigation was actually taking place to prove a violation of section
1510. Nor need the government prove that the accused had actual
knowledge that the obstructed party either conveyed information
about the accused or was about to do so. Rather, the scienter
requirement of section 1510 is satisfied by a showing of a reasonably
founded belief that information had been or was about to be given.
(internal citations omitted).
21. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings #5 Empanelled Jan. 28, 2004, 401
F.3d 247, 251 (4th Cir. 2005) (“Both the attorney-client and work product
privileges may be lost, however, when a client gives information to an attorney
for the purpose of committing or furthering a crime or fraud.”). The
attorney-client privilege protects the disclosure of confidential communications
to counsel when the client seeks legal advice. See id. at 250. However, the
crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege withdraws any protection
where the client sought or employed legal representation to commit, facilitate or
conceal a crime or fraud. See id. at 251. To breach the privilege and invoke the
crime-fraud exception, the government must prove that: (1) “the client was
engaged in or planning criminal or fraudulent scheme when he sought the
advice of counsel” and (2) “the privileged materials bear a close relationship to
the client’s existing or future scheme to commit a crime or fraud.” Id. In In re
Grand Jury Subpoenas Dated March 2, 2015, 628 F. App’x 13, 14 (2d Cir. 2015),
the court held that to invoke the crime-fraud exception the government must
prove: “(1) that the client communication or attorney work product in question
was itself in furtherance of the crime or fraud and (2) probable cause to believe
that the communication with counsel or attorney work product was intended in
some way to facilitate or to conceal the criminal activity.” See also United States
v. Gorski, 807 F.3d 451, 461 (1st Cir. 2015) (concluding that there “was a
reasonable basis to believe that the attorney-client communications ‘were
intended by the client to facilitate or conceal the criminal or fraudulent
activity’”). In In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 745 F.3d 681, 693 (3d Cir. 2014), the
Third Circuit explained that for legal advice to be used “in furtherance” of a
crime, the advice must advance the client’s criminal purpose. Stated another
way, the legal advice cannot merely relate to the criminal conduct; it must be
intended to facilitate or conceal the criminal activity. See id.
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most often through the use of co-conspirator liability under the
federal criminal conspiracy laws or accessory or accomplice
liability under the federal criminal aiding and abetting statute.22
A. Conspiracy to Commit Financial Crimes and Corporate
Misconduct
The federal conspiracy statute incorporates the facilitation
theory by allowing prosecutors to prove culpable participation
with evidence that the defendant knowingly facilitated the
criminal conduct. To convict a defendant of conspiracy to commit
a financial crime or corporate corruption, the government must
prove that a defendant knowingly participated in the conspiracy
to defraud.23 Stated another way, the government must prove:
(1) an agreement to commit a financial crime or engage in
corporate misconduct, (2) willing participation by the defendant,
and (3) that the defendant acted to facilitate the criminal
agreement.24
In most criminal conspiracy prosecutions, the primary
obstacle to sustaining a conviction is proving that the defendant
22. See infra Parts II.A–B (discussing the existence of the facilitation
doctrine in conspiracy and aiding and abetting laws).
23. See 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2012) (requiring at least two people to conspire to
commit a crime or defraud the United States and one of those persons to commit
an act to affect the conspiracy); United States v. Vinson, 852 F.3d 333, 339, 351
(4th Cir. 2017) (affirming defendant’s conviction for conspiracy to commit bank
fraud for attempting to use various entities and shell companies to obtain funds
to “salvage his floundering real estate empire”); United States v. Kuhrt, 788
F.3d 403, 414–16 (5th Cir. 2015) (affirming wire fraud conspiracy conviction of
comptroller for a multi-billion dollar Ponzi scheme engineered by Allen Stanford
and finding that the evidence established that defendant was involved in
planning and executing fraudulent transactions and oversaw fraudulent
accounting specifically designed to cover up scheme to defraud); United States v.
Aloi, 511 F.2d 585, 593 (2d Cir. 1975) (affirming defendant’s conviction for
conspiracy to violate federal securities laws when the defendant and others
arranged the sale of their automobile leasing company’s stock to the public to
pay off their own personal debts).
24. See 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2012) (criminalizing a conspiracy between two or
more persons to defraud or commit any crime against the United States); United
States v. Tucker, 376 F.3d 236, 238 (4th Cir. 2004) (“To prove a conspiracy
under 18 U.S.C. § 371, the government must establish an agreement to commit
an offense, willing participation by the defendant, and an overt act in
furtherance of the conspiracy.”).
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knowingly participated in a criminal conspiracy. The courts have
provided some practical relief to proving that a hard target knew
that he was involved in a criminal conspiracy, thereby placing a
case against a defendant who deliberately insulates himself from
direct involvement in the criminal activity within reach.25 First,
the concert of action (the agreement) may be inferred from “all
the circumstances,”26 and the government need only prove that
there was a “mutual understanding” among co-conspirators.27
Second, knowledge of the criminal conspiracy may be inferred
from “surrounding circumstances,”28 and the government need
not prove that a defendant knew all the details of the criminal
conspiracy provided that he knew of its “essential object[ive].”29
Finally, circumstantial evidence alone is sufficient to support a
conspiracy conviction.30 Therefore, the ability of the government
to sustain a conspiracy conviction for participating in a financial
crime or corporate misconduct will depend on the specific facts of
each case and ultimately requires prosecutors to commit to
following the evidence to its conclusion.
B. Aiding and Abetting Financial Crimes and Corporate
Misconduct
Aiding and abetting liability arises when a person aids,
abets, counsels, commands, induces, procures, or encourages the
commission of a criminal offense.31 The facilitation theory is
25. See United States v. Redmond, 461 F. App’x 317, 318 (4th Cir. 2012)
(finding that a defendant’s intent to defraud may be inferred from totality of the
circumstances and need not be proven by direct evidence); United States v.
Goodwin, 272 F.3d 659, 666 (4th Cir. 2001) (finding that a defendant’s intent to
defraud may be inferred from circumstantial evidence).
26. United States v. Barnes, 747 F.2d 246, 249 (4th Cir. 1984).
27. United States v. Hackley, 662 F.3d 671, 679 (4th Cir. 2011).
28. United States v. Kuhrt, 788 F.3d 403, 416 (5th Cir. 2015).
29. Hackley, 662 F.3d at 679.
30. Id.
31. See 18 U.S.C. § 2 (2012) (detailing that the punishment for those who
aid and abet is the same as the punishment for the principal); Rosemond v.
United States, 134 S. Ct. 1240, 1246 (2014) (“In proscribing aiding and abetting,
Congress used language that ‘comprehends all assistance rendered by words,
acts, encouragement, support or presence,’ . . . .” (quoting Reves v. Ernst &
Young, 507 U.S. 170, 178 (1993))); United States v. Cammorto, 859 F.3d 311,
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incorporated within the federal aiding and abetting statute by
allowing prosecutors to prove culpable participation with
evidence that the defendant knowingly facilitated the criminal
conduct.32 To sustain a conviction under the federal aiding and
abetting statute as an accessory to a corporate crime, the
government must prove that a defendant committed an act in
furtherance of the fraud with the intent to facilitate the criminal
activity.33 The statute has been broadly defined and includes all
acts that influence, enable, further or conceal the criminal
activity.34

317 (4th Cir. 2017) (rejecting defendant’s argument that he could not be liable
as a principal under federal law when he encouraged the commission of the
criminal offense); see also United States v. Kimble, 855 F.3d 604, 613 (4th Cir.
2017) (finding that aiding and abetting is not an independent crime, but rather
sets forth accessory liability); United States v. Sosa, 777 F.3d 1279, 1292 (11th
Cir. 2015) (restating that aiding and abetting, under 18 U.S.C. § 2 (2012), “is not
a separate federal crime, but rather an alternative charge that permits one to be
found guilty as a principal for aiding or procuring someone else to commit the
offense”).
32. See United States v. Danhach, 815 F.3d 228, 235 (5th Cir. 2016)
(articulating that defendant aids and abets a criminal venture when “he
associates with it, participates in it, and seeks by his actions to make the
venture succeed”). In United States v. Peoni, Judge Learned Hand aptly
described how the facilitation theory is incorporated into accessory liability:
“[Accessory liability] demands that [the defendant] in some sort associates
himself with the venture, that he participates in it as in something that he
wishes to bring about, and that he seeks by his actions to make it succeed.” 100
F.2d 401, 402 (2d Cir. 1938). The Supreme Court has adopted Judge Learned
Hand’s formulation of the necessary state of mind for aiding and abetting. See,
e.g., Rosemond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1240, 1248 (2014); Nye & Nissen v.
United States, 336 U.S. 613, 619 (1949).
33. See Rosemond, 134 S. Ct. at 1245 (stating that an aiding and abetting
conviction requires the government to prove that a defendant took an
affirmative act to further the underlying criminal offense with the intent of
facilitating the offense); see also United States v. Thompson, 501 F. App’x 347,
361 (6th Cir. 2012) (“[C]onspiracy involves an agreement to participate in a
wrongful activity, while aiding and abetting can be accomplished if the
defendant ‘knowingly gave substantial assistance to someone who performed
wrongful conduct,’ even if the defendant did not necessarily agree to join in the
conduct.” (quoting Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Leahey Constr. Co., 219 F.3d 519,
534 (6th Cir. 2000))).
34. See United States v. Sosa, 777 F.3d 1279, 1292 (11th Cir. 2015)
(construing the aiding and abetting statute broadly to mean that the
“government must prove that the defendant in some way associated himself
with the criminal venture”).
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Like conspiracy, sustaining an aiding and abetting conviction
is a fact intensive inquiry that will depend on the specific facts of
each case and requires the government to commit to following the
evidence until conclusion. Facilitation theory principles ease this
burden. For example, to support a conclusion that a defendant
committed an act in furtherance of the underlying offense, the
government may use the same evidence used to establish a
defendant’s participation in a conspiracy to commit a financial
crime or engage in corporate misconduct.35 Moreover, like
conspiracy, intent to facilitate can be inferred from the
“surrounding circumstances.”36
C. Mail and Wire Fraud Statutes
The primary federal criminal laws used to address financial
crimes and corporate misconduct are the federal mail and wire
fraud statutes. The mail and wire fraud statutes prohibit the use
of the mails and wires in furtherance of any scheme or artifice to
defraud by means of false or fraudulent pretenses,
representations, or promises.37 The essential elements of these
offenses are: (1) a scheme to defraud, (2) a defendant’s culpable
participation in the scheme to defraud, and (3) use of the mails or
wire communications in furtherance of the scheme to defraud.38
A scheme to defraud would include any act of deceit to obtain
money or property from the victim.39 Therefore, there is no doubt
that a scheme to defraud under the federal fraud statutes would
35. United States v. Vinson, 852 F.3d 333, 354 (4th Cir. 2017) (quoting
United States v. Burgos, 94 F.3d 849, 873 (4th Cir. 1996)).
36. See United States v. Lema, 909 F.2d 561, 570 (1st Cir. 1990) (discussing
that the surrounding circumstances can be considered when determining if the
evidence was sufficient to support an aiding and abetting conviction).
37. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343 (2012) (providing the statutory elements of
mail and wire fraud).
38. See Unites States v. Raza, No. 16-4247, slip op. at 20 (4th Cir. Nov. 20,
2017) (stating that to sustain criminal fraud prosecution, the government must
prove that defendant engaged in a plan or course of action intended to deceive
the victim of money or property).
39. See United States v. Pinson, 860 F.3d 152, 169 (4th Cir. 2017)
(describing that a scheme to defraud requires the government to prove a specific
intent to deprive someone of something of value and does not include
undisclosed self-dealing or breaches of fiduciary duty).
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include most forms of financial crimes and corporate misconduct,
such as the opening of accounts without customer consent,
obtaining credit cards without customer consent, creating fake
email accounts to sign up customers for unwanted banking
services,40 and installing illegal engine software designed to
deceive regulators.41
Prosecutors have often defined a defendant’s culpable
participation narrowly by requiring strong and substantial
evidence that the defendant actively participated in the scheme
to defraud or had direct knowledge of the criminal conduct.42 In
response to recent criticism that prosecutors have failed to hold
senior management accountable for financial crimes and
corporate corruption, the government explained that there is
often insufficient evidence to prove that these targets were aware
of the underlying criminal conduct to the degree necessary to
warrant criminal charges.43 This prosecutorial judgment,
40. See Michael Corkery, Wells Fargo Fined $185 Million for Fraudulently
Opening Accounts, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 8, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/
2016/09/09/business/dealbook/wells-fargo-fined-for-years-of-harm-to-customers.
html (last visited Jan. 30, 2018) (detailing the fines that Wells Fargo paid for
fraudulently opening accounts without customers’ consent) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review); Stacy Cowley, ‘Lions Hunting Zebras’:
Ex-Wells Fargo Bankers Describe Abuses, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 20, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/21/business/dealbook/lions-hunting-zebras-exwells-fargo-bankers-describe-abuses.html (last visited Jan. 30, 2018) (explaining
that Wells Fargo employees admit that they intentionally set up sham accounts
for immigrants, older adults, and other individuals they judged to be vulnerable)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
41. See Jack Ewing & Hiroko Tabuchi, Volkswagen to Pay $14.7 Billion to
Settle
Diesel
Claims
in
U.S.,
N.Y. TIMES
(June
27,
2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/28/business/volkswagen-settlement-dieselscandal.html (last visited Jan. 30, 2018) (discussing that Volkswagen agreed to
pay a fine for installing illegal engine software designed to deceive regulators)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); see Jack Ewing, Danny
Hakim & Aaron M. Kessler, As Volkswagen Pushed to Be No.1, Ambitions
Fueled
A
Scandal,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Sept.
26,
2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/27/business/as-vw-pushed-to-be-no-1ambitions-fueled-a-scandal.html (last visited Jan. 30, 2018) (reporting that
Volkswagen admitted to installing illegal software to cheat emissions testing)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
42. Too Big to Indict, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2012, at A38.
43. See Jesse Signal, Why It’s Unlikely Anyone Will Go to Jail Over Wells
Fargo’s Massive Fraud Scheme, NY MAG. (Sept. 9, 2016, 2:47 PM),
http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2016/09/why-no-one-will-go-to-jail-overwells-fargos-fraud-scheme.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2018) (“[A]s one former
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however, ignores any meaningful effort to prove culpable
participation by proving that a defendant facilitated the criminal
conduct.
To prove that a defendant knowingly facilitated the criminal
conduct under the mail and wire fraud statute, the prosecution
must show that a defendant acted knowingly to influence, enable,
further or concealed the criminal conduct.44 Regardless of the
reluctance to directly incorporate the facilitation theory into the
mail and wire fraud statutes and define the conduct as falling
within these limits, the federal conspiracy statute and the aiding
and abetting statute clearly incorporate the facilitation theory.
This allows federal prosecutors a vehicle to extend the mail and
wire fraud statutes to hold senior managers, third-party
professionals, and others accountable for financial crimes and
corporate corruption.
D. Deliberate Ignorance
Prosecutors can also use a willful blindness instruction to
overcome any factual barriers in prosecuting hard targets. To
prove culpable participation under the facilitation theory, the
government must prove that a defendant facilitated the criminal
conduct, which requires showing knowledge. A target is aware of
criminal activity when he directly participates in or has direct
knowledge of the criminal activity.45 Typically, prosecutors look
for evidence that the target was present at meetings during
government official who had been involved in money-laundering cases
[said] . . . building a strong case against individuals can be difficult given how
big and complicated banks are . . . .”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
44. United States v Wynn, 684 F.3d 473, 478 (4th Cir. 2012) (finding that
scheme to defraud necessarily requires evidence of intent to defraud).
45. See United States v. Crabtree, 878 F.3d 1274 (11th Cir. 2018)
(affirming fraud conviction and finding sufficient evidence that defendants were
aware of the scheme to defraud); United States v Blankenship, 846 F3d 663, 679
(4th Cir. 2017) (affirming conviction of senior executive based on evidence that
he knew his actions and omissions would lead to violations of mine safety laws
and regulations); United States v. Redmond, 461 F. App’x 317, 318 (4th Cir.
2012) (affirming wire fraud conviction and finding sufficient evidence that
defendant knew that he was engaged in a scheme to defraud).
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which the wrongdoing is discussed or for evidence that the
criminal conduct is disclosed in reports, memorandum, or email
messages that are sent to or by the target.46 In addition to direct
evidence of knowledge, the government can prove that a
defendant was aware of criminal activity by showing that he
deliberately looked the other way, shut his eyes to the
wrongdoing, or ignored red flags that the criminal conduct was
occurring.47 Therefore, the evidentiary burden to prove that a
defendant knowingly facilitated the crime can be mitigated by
showing that the target was willfully blind to the criminal
activity.
Federal criminal law recognizes that there are consequences
for the failure to respond to obvious signals of criminal activity.
Under the willful blindness doctrine, the government may prove
the knowledge element of conspiracy and aiding and abetting by
establishing that a defendant deliberately shielded himself from
clear evidence of criminal activity.48 The willful blindness
46. See Jack Ewing, VW Presentation in ’06 Showed How to Foil Emissions
Tests, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 26, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/27/
business/international/vw-presentation-in-06-showed-how-to-foil-emissions-tests.
html (last visited Jan. 30, 2018) (reporting on how a top technology executive at
Volkswagen prepared a PowerPoint presentation in 2006 that laid out in detail
how Volkswagen could cheat on emissions tests in United States) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review).
47. See United States v. Hawkins, 796 F.3d 843, 867 (8th Cir. 2015)
(“With respect to the knowledge element [of conspiracy], ‘a defendant’s willful
blindness may serve as the basis for knowledge if, in light of certain obvious
facts, reasonable inferences support a finding that a defendant’s failure to
investigate is equivalent to burying one's head in the sand.’”); United States v.
Schnabel, 939 F.2d 197, 203–04 (4th Cir. 1991)
A [willful blindness] instruction may be given if there is a foundation
in evidence to support it. At trial, the government introduced
evidence of a wide variety of fraudlent practices that took place at the
the [] office . . . while [the defendant] was a vice-president there. This
evidence alone could easily support the inference that if [the
defendant] was unaware of what was happening around him, it was
because he deliberately shut his eyes to it.
48. See, e.g., United States v. Vinson, 852 F.3d 333, 357 (4th Cir 2017)
(“[The] evidence suggests, ‘at a minimum,’ that Vinson ‘deliberately failed to ask
questions that might have incriminated him.’ Thus, the trial court acted well
within its discretion in charging the jury on willful blindness.”); United States v.
Ford, 821 F.3d 63, 74 (1st Cir. 2016) (concluding that willful blindness—
ignoring red flags—meets the knowledge element of aiding and abetting
liability); United States v. Ruhe, 191 F.3d 376, 384 (4th Cir. 1999) (“A ‘willful
blindness’ . . . instruction ‘allows the jury to impute the element of knowledge to
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doctrine is not a vehicle for the government to rely on concepts of
recklessness or negligence to prove knowledge, but when a
defendant ignores “warning signs” of criminal activity or
“deliberately insulates” himself from evidence of criminal
activity, a deliberate ignorance instruction will be provided to the
jury.49
The evidence warranting a deliberate ignorance or willful
blindness instruction is not defined with precision. It requires the
government to prove more than negligence or recklessness, but
less than actual knowledge. It is premised on the idea that a
defendant who intentionally insulates himself from proximity to
or intimate knowledge of questionable corporate practices should
not be allowed to escape the reach of criminal statutes that
require the government to prove that a defendant acted
knowingly.50 Therefore, the critical questions are: (1) was the
defendant aware of signals of criminal activity and (2) if yes,
what was the reason why that the defendant ignored these “red
flags.” The risk that a defendant could be inadvertently convicted
for his negligence or recklessness is substantially mitigated by
the second element of the facilitation theory: that the government

a defendant if the evidence indicates that he purposely closed his eyes to avoid
knowing what was taking place around him.’” (quoting United States v.
Schnabel, 939 F.2d 197, 203 (4th Cir. 1991))); United States v. Jinwright, 683
F.3d 471, 478 (4th Cir. 2012) (“To allow the most clever, inventive, and
sophisticated wrongdoers to hide behind a constant and conscious purpose of
avoiding knowledge of criminal misconduct would be an injustice in its own
right.”).
49. See United States v. St. Junius, 739 F.3d 193, 205 (5th Cir. 2013)
(determining that a willful blindness “instruction is proper when the evidence
shows (1) subjective awareness of a high probability of the existence of illegal
conduct, and (2) purposeful contrivance to avoid learning of the illegal conduct”
(quoting United States v. Jones, 664 F.3d 966, 979 (5th Cir. 2011))).
50. See United States v. Hale, 857 F.3d 158, 168–69 (4th Cir. 2017)
(affirming trial court’s decision to give a willful blindness instruction when there
was ample direct and circumstantial evidence that defendant took steps to avoid
knowing that over-the-counter medications and health-and-beauty aids were
stolen); Jinwright, 683 F.3d at 478 (stating a willful blindness instruction is
warranted when “evidence demonstrates that a defendant undertook an active
and deliberate effort to avoid imbuing himself with the knowledge that would
support a criminal conviction”); Ruhe, 191 F.3d at 385 (determining a willful
blindness instruction was warranted where the owner of an aircraft repair
facility ignored several warning signs that parts were stolen).
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must prove that the defendant acted to influence, enable, further,
or conceal the financial crime or corporate misconduct.51
For example, in United States v. Uzoaga,52 the
defendant-doctor was convicted of health care fraud, conspiracy to
commit health care fraud, and aiding and abetting.53 At trial, the
government introduced evidence that patient files repeatedly
showed that patients were undergoing excessive testing by a
third-party provider, which resulted in the filing of excessive
Medicare claims.54 On appeal, the defendant claimed that the
trial court erred in giving a deliberate ignorance instruction.55
The Fifth Circuit rejected the defendant’s argument, finding that
the defendant’s constant review of patient files proved that she
was aware of the excessive treatment by the third-party service
provider.56 The court further explained that the defendant was
“aware of a high probability of illegal conduct,” but continued
using this third-party provider for testing and treatment and
failed “to inquire or investigate the treatment provider’s business
practices or become more involved herself in patient billing or
treatment.”57 Thus, the court affirmed the trial court’s ruling that
the willful blindness instruction was warranted.58
The government has often concluded that a prosecution of a
corporate target is precluded by the lack of strong and
51. See United States v. Appolon, 695 F.3d 44, 57 (1st Cir. 2012) (“Willful
blindness serves as an alternate theory on which the government may prove
knowledge.” (quoting United States v. Perez-Melendez, 599 F.3d 31, 41 (1st Cir.
2010))).
52. 680 F. App’x 343 (5th Cir. 2017).
53. Id.
54. Id. at 344.
55. Id. at 343.
56. See id. at 344 (“[H]er files were copiously detailed and well organized,
especially regarding a patient’s plan of care, and the files noted patient
progress.”).
57. Id.; see also United States v. Hansen, 791 F.3d 863, 870 (8th Cir. 2015)
(upholding willful blindness instruction because defendant deliberately failed to
make inquiries despite numerous red flags of criminal activity); United States v.
Adorno-Molina, 774 F.3d 116, 124–25 (1st Cir. 2014) (determining willful
blindness instruction was warranted because there was evidence revealing
“flags” of suspicion that went uninvestigated, including the use of straw owners
to purchase vehicles, the vehicles’ involvement in crimes linked to a drug
trafficking organization, and frequent cash transfers).
58. See Uzoaga, 680 F. App’x at 343.
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substantial evidence that the target was aware of the criminal
activity.59 However, applying generally accepted principles of
federal criminal law, the government can prove knowledge with
evidence of actual knowledge or with evidence of deliberate
ignorance—that the target was confronted with red flags but
consciously looked the other way.60 Therefore, the deliberate
ignorance instruction allows the government to prove knowledge
based on evidence that the defendant deliberately remained
silent about facts of interest that indicated that the conduct was
59. See Matt Apuzzo & Ben Protess, Justice Department Sets Sights on
Wall Street Executives, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 2015, at A1
The Obama Justice Department faced repeated criticism that it
treated corporate executives leniently. After the 2008 financial crisis,
no top Wall Street executives went to prison, highlighting a disparity
in how prosecutors treat corporate leaders and typical
criminals . . . Justice Department officials have defended their record
fighting corporate crime, saying that it can be nearly impossible to
charge top executives who insulate themselves from direct
involvement in wrong doing . . . .
Jack Ewing, Inside VW’s Campaign of Trickery, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 2017, at
BU1 (describing claim by former chief executive at VW that, although he
received memorandum disclosing use of illegal defeat device, there was no proof
that he actually read the document); William D. Cohan, A Clue to the Scarcity of
Financial
Crisis
Prosecutions,
N.Y.
TIMES
(July
21,
2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/22/business/dealbook/a-clue-to-the-scarcityoffinancial-crisis-prosecutions.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2018)
quoting Eric Holder as follows: “[W]e have a responsibility in the
Justice Department to only bring those cases where we think we have
a better than 50 percent chance of winning, and if you look at the
different ways in which decision-making was made in these financial
institutions, we simply didn’t have the ability to point to specific
individuals to say that person was responsible for this specific
action.”
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); David Ingram & Aruna
Viseanatha, Justice Department Drops Goldman Financial Crisis Probe,
REUTERS (Aug. 9, 2012), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-goldmannocharges/justice-department-drops-goldman-financial-crisis-probeid
USBRE8781LA20120810 (last visited Feb. 24, 2018) (reporting on Justice
Department decision to not bring criminal charges in response to allegations of
fraud related to subprime mortgage securities based on conclusion that “the
burden of proof to bring s criminal case could not be met . . . . ) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
60. See United States v. Ford, 821 F.3d 63, 74 (1st Cir. 2016) (holding that
willful blindness—ignoring red flags—meets the knowledge element of aiding
and abetting liability).
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criminal and that he looked the other way in order to insulate
himself from accountability.
E. Using the Facilitation Theory to Overcome Factual Barriers
As a practical matter, there are no legal barriers to bringing
corporate crime and corruption into full view and holding these
targets accountable for their participation. The facilitation theory
provides a meaningful path to sustain a criminal fraud
prosecution. It should be acknowledged, however, that bringing
financial corruption to light and holding hard targets accountable
for financial crimes and corporate misconduct will require a
sustained and persistent effort by the government to follow the
evidence to its conclusion and expose the truth. These cases often
involve complex fact patterns and shifting narratives. Hard
targets have the power to intimidate witnesses and the resources
to stonewall requests for information.61 They have the
connections to shape the media coverage of the investigation. In
addition, hard targets often intentionally insulate themselves
from proximity to and intimate knowledge of questionable
corporate practices.62 Regardless of the risks and frustrations,
federal prosecutors have a responsibility to be aggressive in their
demands for accountability.
Defendants accused of engaging in corporate corruption and
financial crimes typically respond to allegations of misconduct by
either admitting that they actively participated in the activity,
but claiming that the conduct was not illegal, or by conceding
that the conduct was illegal, but claiming that they were not
aware of the conduct.63 However, the wrongdoing on the scale
that warrants federal criminal charges typically does not occur
without the influence and support of senior management or the
enabling expertise, judgment, skill and experience of third-party
61. See Megan Twohey, Jodi Kantor, Susan Dominus, Jim Rutenberg &
Steve Eder, Weinstein’s Complicity Machine, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 5, 2017)
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/12/05/us/harvey-weinstein-complicity.
html (last visited Feb. 1, 2018) (describing use of power to intimidate victims
and shield sexual assaults by film producer Harvey Weinstein) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
62. Id.
63. Infra note 64.
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professionals.64 It also generally does not reflect an isolated
instance, but rather involves a pattern and practice of
questionable behavior that occurs over a significant period of
time.65 It also generally does not occur without the direct
64. See United States v Stein, 846 F.3d 1135 (11th Cir. 2017) (affirming
fraud conviction of attorney based on evidence that he “fabricated press releases
and purchase orders to inflate the stock price of his client [company]”); Jonathan
Soble, Kobe Steel Blames Plant Managers for Scandal, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11,
2017, at B4 (describing internal company’s conclusion that practice of falsifying
data was spurred by the “pursuit of short-term profits” and “furthered by lax
oversight by senior executives and an ‘insular’ corporate culture that
discouraged employees from questioning improper but long-standing established
practices”); Bill Vlasic, Volkswagen Official Is Sentenced to 7 Years, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 6, 2017, at B3 (explaining that a former VW manager admitted that he
concealed from government regulators the existence of software that allowed the
company to cheat on emissions tests, but claimed that senior management and a
“high-ranking in-house lawyer” were complicit in the scheme to defraud); Jan
Wolfe & Nate Raymond, Ex-Lawyer for Pharma Executive Shkreli Convicted of
Aiding Fraud Scheme, REUTERS (Dec. 27, 2017) https://ca.reuters.com/article/
businessNews/idCAKBN1EL1KP-OCABS (last visited Feb. 1, 2018) (“Acting
U.S. Attorney Bridget Rohde in Brooklyn said the verdict sent a message to
lawyers that they will be held accountable when they ‘use their legal expertise
to facilitate the commission of crime.’”) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review); Stacy Cowley & Jennifer A. Kingson, Wells Fargo to Claw Back
$75 Million From 2 Former Executives, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 2017, at A1
(reporting on conclusion by Wells Fargo internal report that former chief
executive “turned a blind eye” to fraudulent practices). In a Wells Fargo internal
investigation memo, a manager said employees “feel they cannot make sales
goals without gaming the system; the incentive to cheat is based on the fear of
losing their jobs.” Jennifer A. Kingson & Stacy Cowley, At Wells Fargo,
Crushing Pressure and Lax Oversight Produced a Scandal, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 10,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/10/business/dealbook/11wells-fargoaccount-scandal.html (last visited Feb. 1, 2018) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
65. See Neal E. Boudette & Jonathan Soble, Kobe Steel’s Falsified Data is
Another Blow to Japan’s Reputation, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 10, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/10/business/kobe-steel-japan.html (last visited
Feb. 12, 2018) (reporting that Kobe Steel has acknowledged falsifying data
about the quality of aluminum and cooper it sold with possible data falsification
going back ten years) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Stacy
Cowley, Wells Fargo Review Finds 1.4 Million More Suspect Accounts, N. Y.
Times
(Aug.
31,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/31/business
/dealbook/wells-fargo-accounts.html (last visited Feb. 12, 2018) (reporting that
Wells Fargo employees opened 2.1 million suspect accounts from 2011 to mid2015) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Jack Ewing, VW
Engineers Wanted O.K. From the Top for Emissions Fraud, Documents Show,
N.Y.
TIMES
(May
17,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/17/
business/volkswagen-muller-diesel-emissions.html (last visited Feb. 12, 2018)
(reporting that Volkswagen installed illegal software in 600,000 Volkswagen,
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knowledge of numerous actors and/or the deliberate ignorance of
numerous others.66 Finally, corporate crimes on the scale that
warrant federal criminal charges typically do not occur without
the criminal conduct, at least to some degree, being exposed in
documents, memorandum, and emails.67
Thus, applying the facilitation theory, a target influences,
enables, furthers or conceals financial crimes or corporate
misconduct when he: (1) creates a toxic culture by setting
unreasonable profit or sales targets to increase profits and
personal bonuses, (2) creates a culture of risk by repeatedly
ignoring compliance obligations, (3) creates a culture of risk by
failing to “draw the line” or exercise meaningful oversight
responsibilities, (4) ignores or turns a “blind eye” to the
wrongdoing, exercises a passive indifference to questionable
practices, or fails to investigate “red flags” that plainly indicated
misconduct or fraudulent practices, or (5) acts to conceal the

Audi, and Porsche diesel cars sold in the United States and 11 million
worldwide over a period of seven years) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
66. See Jack Ewing, More VW Executives Could Be Charged, Court
Documents Suggest, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 13, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/
2017/01/13/business/volkswagen-emissions-scandal-charges.html (last visited
Feb. 23, 2018) (describing that in the Volkswagen emissions scandal, court
document reflect a broad conspiracy that include engine developers, software
experts, quality control managers, in-house lawyers, and people responsible for
emissions compliance) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).;
Michael Corkery, Wells Fargo Fined $185 Million for Fraudulently Opening
Accounts,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Sept.
8,
2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/
2016/09/09/business/dealbook/wells-fargo-fined-for-years-of-harm-to-customers.html
(last visited Feb. 23, 2018) (explaining that the Wells Fargo scandal involved at
least 5600 employees) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); see
also Christine Hauser & Maya Salam, As Testimony Piles Up Against Doctor,
Several on Gymnastics Board Resign, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2017, at A10 (“[M]ore
than a dozen [victims] asked how the abuse could have gone on for decades, and
why organizations such as the national gymnastics governing body and
Michigan State University, his employer—enabled him or turned a blind eye.”).
67. See Jack Ewing, VW Presentation in ’06 Showed How to Foil Emissions
Tests, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 26, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/27/business
/international/vw-presentation-in-06-showed-how-to-foil-emissions-tests.html
(last visited Feb. 23, 2018) (describing how a top technology executive at
Volkswagen prepared a PowerPoint presentation in 2006 that laid out in detail
how the automaker could cheat on emissions tests in the United States) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).

276

74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 256 (2018)

misconduct or misleads regulators by intimidating witnesses or
altering or destroying documents.68
F. Prosecutorial Discretion
Recently, the courts have expressed concerns about the
unchecked exercise of prosecutorial discretion and have
questioned the use of prosecutorial discretion to define the scope
of criminal conduct.69 The effort to impose some restraints on the
68. See Stacy Cowley & Jennifer A. Kingson, Wells Fargo to Claw Back $75
Million From 2 Former Executives, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 10, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/10/business/wells-fargo-pay-executivesaccounts-scandal.html (last visited Feb. 3, 2018) (describing toxic culture of
setting ruthless and unrealistic sales goals, such as managers telling
subordinates to sell people accounts even if they did not need them) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review); Jack Ewing, Inside VW’s Campaign of
Trickery,
N.Y.
TIMES
(May
6,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/
2017/05/06/business/inside-vws-campaign-of-trickery.html (last visited Feb. 3,
2018) (describing a practice at Volkswagen to provide regulators with false and
misleading or incomplete data in order to cover-up the use of the illegal
software) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Jack Ewing,
Volkswagen Inquiry’s Focus to Include Managers Who Turned a Blind Eye, N.Y.
TIMES
(Oct.
26,
2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/26/
business/international/volkswagen-investigation-focus-to-include-managerswho-turned-a-blind-eye.html (last visited Feb. 3, 2018) (reporting that former
employees have asserted that there was a culture inside VW that “discouraged
open discussion of problems, creating a climate in which people may have been
fearful of speaking up”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review);
Landon Thomas Jr., Deutsche Bank Fined in Plan to Help Russians Launder
$10 Billion, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 30, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/
2017/01/30/business/dealbook/deutsche-bank-fined-for-helping-russians-launder10-billion.html (last visited Feb. 3, 2018) (describing practice of laundering $10
billion in questionable funds from Russia and “pervasive culture at Deutsche of
skirting regulators to pad profits and personal bonuses”) (on file with
Washington and Lee Law Review); Bill Vlasic, G.M. Lawyers Hid Fatal Flaw,
From Critics and One Another, N.Y. TIMES (June 6, 2014),
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/07/business/gm-lawyers-hid-fatal-flaw-fromcritics-and-one-another.html (last visited Feb. 3, 2018) (reporting that GM legal
department acted to conceal product defect from regulators) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review); Bill Vlasic, G.M. Inquiry Cites Years of
Neglect Over Fatal Defect, N.Y. TIMES (June 5, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com
/2014/06/06/business/gm-ignition-switch-internal-recall-investigation-report.html
(last visited Feb. 3, 2018) (describing an internal inquiry that revealed a culture
where employees across departments neglected to repair the safety defect and
issue a recall despite “a mountain of evidence that lives were at risk”) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
69. See Maslenjak v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1918, 1927 (2017) (reversing
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prosecutorial discretion is legitimate. Prosecutorial discretion
should not drive the application of the law and the government’s
effort to seek sanctions against individuals. On the other hand,
the use of the facilitation theory to hold hard targets accountable
for financial corruption is not an arbitrary effort to define
criminal conduct or expand prosecutorial discretion. Rather,
these prosecutions would be within the limits set by existing
federal criminal statutes and established doctrines. Moreover,
holding hard targets accountable furthers the interest of justice
by making the application of the law fundamentally fair and not
a study in impunity where the affluent and powerful are beyond
the reach of accountability.
III. Conclusion
Bringing financial corruption to light and holding hard
targets accountable for financial crimes and corporate corruption
will require a sustained and persistent effort by the government
to follow the evidence to conclusion. These cases often involve
complex fact patterns and shifting narratives. Hard targets have
the resources to stonewall requests for information and access to
witnesses. They have the connections to intimidate and shape the
media coverage of the investigation. In addition, hard targets
often intentionally insulate themselves from proximity to and
intimate knowledge of questionable corporate practices.
Regardless of the risks and frustrations, federal prosecutors have
a responsibility to be aggressive in their demands for
accountability because there is a substantial cost in failing to
immigration conviction, holding that government was required to prove
connection between false statement on application and obtaining citizenship,
and writing that the government’s position “would give prosecutors nearly
limitless leverage”); McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355, 2371, 2375
(2016) (reversing public corruption conviction and adopting restrictive definition
of “official act”); Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2012 (2015) (reversing
internet threat conviction and requiring the government to prove more than
negligence); Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2086 (2014) (reversing
chemical weapons use and possession convictions and finding that the statute
was not intended to reach wholly local crime); United States v. Stevens, 559
U.S. 460, 480 (2009) (reversing conviction for the sale of dog fighting videos and
refusing to uphold an unconstitutional statute on the government’s promise that
they will use it responsibly).

278

74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 256 (2018)

hold hard targets accountable. This failure only serves to allow
the conduct to continue and establishes a culture where
accountability is not valued, and individuals with power,
relationships, and influence can act without consequences.70
Moreover, failing to hold hard targets accountable will further
the hard-edged populism and the perception that the criminal
justice system is fundamentally unfair and disproportionately
applied against targets without power and influence.71
70. The continued record of corporate misconduct makes any assertion that
what is in place provides a meaningful deterrence to financial crimes and
corporate misconduct questionable. See, e.g., Danielle Ivory, G.M. Reveals It Was
Told of Ignition Defect In ’01, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 12, 2014),
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/13/business/gm-reveals-it-was-told-ofignition-defect-in-01.html (last visited Feb. 3, 2018) (reporting that General
Motors admitted that it had received reports as early as 2001 of a safety defect
in its cars that is now linked to 12 deaths and at least 31 accidents) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review); Jonathan Soble, Kobe Steel Scandal
Grows to Include Subsidiaries, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 13, 2017), https://www.nytimes.
com/2017/10/13/business/kobe-steel-scandal.html (last visited Feb. 3, 2018)
(discussing an admission by a Japanese global steel supplier that it deliberately
falsified data and altered inspection certificates about quality of aluminum and
copper supplier to hundreds of manufacturers including Toyota, Ford, General
Motors, and Boeing) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review);
Reuters, Deutsche Bank and Justice Dept. Complete Deal on Mortgage Crisis,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Jan.
17,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/17/
business/deutsche-bank-and-justice-dept-complete-deal-on-mortgage-crisis.html
(last visited Feb. 3, 2018) (explaining that Deutsche Bank agreed to pay $7.2
billion for its sale of toxic mortgages in run-up to the 2008 financial crisis and
that the bank made false and misleading representations to investors about the
loans underling millions of dollars’ worth of mortgages securities issues by the
bank in 2006 and 2007) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
71. See Gretchen Morgenson, How Letting Bankers Off the Hook May Have
Tipped the Election, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 11, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com
/2016/11/13/business/how-letting-bankers-off-the-hook-may-have-tipped-theelection.html (last visited Feb. 3, 2018)
There are many facets to the populist, anti-establishment anger that
swept Donald J. Trump into the White House in Tuesday’s election. A
crucial element fueling the rage, in my view, was this: Not one
high-ranking executive at a major financial firm was held to account
for the crisis of 2008. As millions of foreclosures and job losses
followed, the failure to go after fraudsters confirmed the suspicion
that the powerful got protection while those on Main Street were
kicked to the curb. When Mr. Trump asserted that the system was
rigged, he tapped directly into such misgivings . . . . The failure to
prosecute even one or two high-profile bankers—or force them simply
to pay fines and penalties out of their own pockets—left millions of
Americans believing that our justice system was unjust.
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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In response to criticism that the government’s prosecutorial
judgment has been compromised and that federal prosecutors
rarely turn their scrutiny upwards, the government has
explained that a combination of factual and legal issues presents
a substantial barrier to bringing cases against hard targets.72
However, a meaningful effort has not been made to use the
facilitation theory to hold executive management, third-party
professionals or others accountable for corporate fraud.73 The
72. The lack of a meaningful effort to hold hard targets accountable for
financial crimes is not the result of legal barriers and a viable legal theory of
prosecution. It could be the result of the lack of skill, judgment or experience to
follow a complex evidentiary narrative to conclusion. More likely, however, the
failure to make a meaningful effort to follow the evidence until conclusion
against hard targets is the result of a calculation of the career and ambition
risks of moving against powerful and influential targets and a reticence to act in
a way that will leave prosecutors with shredded careers. The injustice is
compounded by the recognition that these prosecutors can suspend their
ambitions and fears of stalled careers and ruined reputations to pursue the
evidence to conclusion against easy targets from main street and poor
neighborhoods. See Jesse Eisinger, Why Only One Top Banker Went to Jail for
the
Financial
Crisis,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Apr.
30,
2014),
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/04/magazine/only-one-top-banker-jailfinancial-crisis.html?mtrref=www.bing.com (last visited Feb. 3, 2018)
(discussing the numerous reasons that federal prosecutors are not seeking
convictions against hard targets, including that the cases were complex to
investigate, “infernally difficult” to explain to juries, and fear of losing the case)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). Moreover, as long as the
government looks the other way, the conduct will continue unabated, and the
financial cost and the impact on the working class and poor Americans will
accelerate. See Ben Casselman, A Lasting Scar of Recession; 1.5 Million Workers
Vanish, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 2017, at B1 (describing the “disappearance” of
workers from the economy as a result of the financial crisis last decade and
asserting that many of these workers have fallen into drug addiction and
poverty).
73. See Gretchen Morgenson, A Bank Too Big to Jail, N.Y. TIMES (July 15,
2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/17/business/a-bank-too-big-to-jail.html
(last visited Feb. 3, 2018)
Have you ever wondered why the 2008 financial crisis generated
almost no criminal prosecutions of large banks and their top
executives? Then take a moment to read the congressional report
issued on July 11, [2017] titled “Too Big to Jail.” Citing internal
documents that the United States Treasury took three years to
produce, the report shows how regulators and prosecutors turned a
potential criminal prosecution of a large global bank—HSBC—into a
watered-down settlement that insulated its executes and failed to
take into account the full scope of the bank’s violations.
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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facilitation theory of prosecution under federal criminal law can
be used to extend the reach of the federal fraud statutes to hold
hard targets accountable for criminal corporate conduct.74
Prosecutors can use the aiding and abetting statute,
co-conspirator liability, and willful blindness instructions to
convict hard targets of financial crimes and corporate misconduct
by showing that they acted to facilitate the wrongdoing. The
result would be a practical and meaningful theory of criminal
prosecution that would establish real consequences for
facilitating corporate criminal conduct.75

74. In a memo by Attorney General Jeff Sessions, he mandated that
prosecutors “pursue the toughest possible charges and sentences against crime
suspects,” highlighting drug dealing, gun crime, and gang violence. Rebecca R.
Ruiz, Sessions Tells Prosecutors to Seek Harsher Penalties, N.Y. TIMES, May 13,
2017, at A15. It is still to be determined whether this mandate applies beyond
violent crimes and drug trafficking offenses and to financial crimes and
corporate corruption.
75. In conclusion, perhaps Robert Kennedy provided the most important
guidance: “Every time we turn our heads the other way when we see the law
flouted, when we tolerate what we know to be wrong, when we close our eyes
and ears to the corrupt because we are too busy or too frightened, when we fail
to speak up and speak out, we strike a blow against freedom and decency and
justice.” Remarks before the Joint Defense Appeal of the American Jewish
Committee and the Anti-Defamation League of the B’nai B’rith (June 21, 1961).

